According to the Public Relations and International Affairs Office of the IRC, this report was prepared by the Islamic Insurance Studies Research Department.

The report emphasizes that professional liability insurance for physicians, within contemporary legal systems, is not merely an optional contract but is recognized as one of the most important risk management tools in the health sector and a fundamental pillar for guaranteeing compensation for damages arising from medical errors.

The research findings indicate that although professional liability insurance for physicians has had a decades-long presence in Iran’s insurance market, it still lacks a compulsory, integrated, and comprehensive framework. Existing coverage is mainly based on the individual will of physicians and suffers from fragmentation and inconsistency regarding the scope of coverage, extent of obligations, and collective inclusion.

The report references the legislative evolution of medical liability insurance in Iran, citing Article 74, Clause “Kh” of the Sixth Development Plan Law, which for the first time mandates all members of the Medical and Veterinary System organizations to obtain professional liability insurance. Furthermore, it recognizes this insurance policy as a collateral for securing compensation in cases of unintentional offenses.

Another section of the report analyzes the basis for mandating physicians to carry professional liability insurance by invoking juridical maxims such as the principle of “la dharar” (no harm), the principle of averting probable harm, the obligation to preserve life, the right to health as a public right, and the capacities of governmental jurisprudence and public interest. Accordingly, mandatory governmental intervention in this domain, insofar as it aims at preventing harm, ensuring compensation for victims, and safeguarding public health order, is not only permissible but also justifiable and defensible.

Additionally, the report examines the foundations of civil liability, the theory and presumption of fault in medical activities, and the relationship between insurance mandates and the principle of contractual freedom. It demonstrates that compelling physicians to conclude professional liability insurance does not fundamentally conflict with private law principles. This obligation can be justified within the framework of public interest, compensatory justice, protection of the weaker party (patients), and improving the effectiveness of the compensation system.

The theory of distributive justice is also introduced as one of the most important legal bases for the insurance mandate. According to this theory, damages resulting from high-risk and socially indispensable activities such as healthcare services should not rest solely on a single physician or patient but should be distributed broadly through institutional mechanisms like insurance.

In its concluding section, the report offers a set of executive and policy recommendations: legally mandating physicians to obtain professional liability insurance; relying on governmental jurisprudential bases and public interest; formulating specific regulations in this field; designing incentive and penalty mechanisms regarding insurance premiums; differentiating risk levels and specialties in determining insurance obligations; establishing a comprehensive registration and supervision system for physicians’ liability insurance; and creating a compensation guarantee fund for medical incidents to cover cases of insufficient or absent insurance coverage.

The report concludes by underscoring that the design and establishment of a mandatory professional liability insurance system for physicians in Iranian law is both jurisprudentially and legally feasible and legitimate. Its implementation could represent an effective step towards enhancing physicians’ professional security, providing robust support to patients, and achieving compensatory justice in the national healthcare system.